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In the early history of psychoanalysis, the work of Wilhelm Stekel (1868–1940) 
was by and large neglected, even though he wrote a considerable number of 
psychoanalytic studies, some of which should be considered to have had a major 
inﬂ uence on Freud’s early thought. Freud, in turn, had much greater inﬂ uence on 
Stekel than is commonly believed. In this article, the authors aim to uncover some 
of these mutual inﬂ uences, in particular in the ﬁ eld of practice, by focusing on the 
elements of autobiography and self-analysis. The authors have identiﬁ ed a number 
of covert autobiographical passages in the work of Stekel, and attempt to link one of 
these ‘revelations’ to an equally covert response to it by Freud. In the closing section 
of this article, the authors argue that Stekel’s attempt to imitate Freud’s self-analysis 
contributed to the fracture between the two of them.
Keywords: Wilhelm Stekel, Sigmund Freud, early history of psychoanalysis, autobiographical 
narratives, self-analysis, training analysis, masturbation, blind spots
Flecte quod est rigidum—Fove quod est frigidum [Bend what is rigid—Cherish what is cold]
From the medieval hymn ‘Veni, Sancte Spiritus’, Laudes Vespertinae, attributed to 
Archbishop Stephen Langton.
Introduction
Wilhelm Stekel (1868–1940) was one of Sigmund Freud’s earliest and most 
important followers, who worked in close collaboration with him for over 10 years 
and was among the ﬁ rst to practise psychoanalysis after Freud. Or was he?
Stekel (1950a, p. 113) claimed that he began practising psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy in 1903 and that his ﬁ rst ‘real case’—a 42-year-old rabbi, whose case 
is described in his book on Nervous anxiety states (1921)—was referred to him by 
Freud. After his break with Freud in 1912 he continued to call himself a psychoanalyst 
(although he would refer to the practice as ‘Psychanalyse’)2 and believed, in the 
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1Corresponding author.
2The only other analyst who referred to it as ‘Psychanalyse’ was the Swiss analyst Oskar Pﬁ ster, who 
believed this to be a linguistically more correct spelling.
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account of Fritz Wittels, that Freud’s school had become ‘entangled in mysticism and 
philosophy’, whereas he himself had remained faithful to ‘true analysis, the medical 
work’ (Timms, 1995, p. 114).
While far from acknowledging this claim, Freud did admit in a letter to him after 
their ways had parted that Stekel had remained ‘loyal to psychoanalysis’. However, 
he added, even if he had been ‘useful to it’ (i.e. psychoanalysis), he had also ‘done it 
great harm’ (Freud to Stekel, 13 January 1924, in Letters of Sigmund Freud, 1960). 
It is well known that the break with Stekel was a considerable relief to Freud, and 
he would come to speak of him in a less than friendly manner, referring to him 
in public as someone who had gone ‘totally astray’ (1914, p. 19) and, in private, 
reserving much worse terms for him, such as the characterisations ‘morally insane’ 
(Freud to Ferenczi, 13 September 1912, cited in Jones, 1953–7, Vol. II, p. 137) 
and ‘imbecile’ [schwachsinnig] (unpublished letter of Freud to Rank, 13 September 
1912). Moreover, Freud had always been reluctant to acknowledge publicly Stekel’s 
position within the ‘movement’, he rarely hinted at their one-time close collaboration 
and, never in the 50 or so references to Stekel throughout the 24 volumes of the 
Standard Edition did he ever refer to him as his (former) ‘follower’.3 Instead, Stekel 
is referred to as ‘a colleague’ or ‘an experienced colleague’ or, more often, simply as 
‘Dr Stekel’ or ‘Wilhelm Stekel’, a fact that had not escaped Stekel’s attention: ‘Freud 
quoted me repeatedly “Herr Dr Stekel”, which otherwise with other authors (Adler 
etc.) was never the case’ (1926, p. 553).4 His defection is only dealt with in passing 
in the polemical ‘On the history of the psychoanalytic movement’ (Freud, 1914), 
as if it were an entirely insigniﬁ cant event. Only in 1925 would Freud publicly say 
something about Stekel’s former capacity as a psychoanalyst, admitting even that he 
himself had at one time been ‘under his inﬂ uence’. In a passage added to chapter 5 
of the 6th edition of Psychopathology of everyday life, Freud wrote,
That writer [Stekel], who has perhaps damaged psychoanalysis as much as he has beneﬁ ted 
it, brought forward a large number of unsuspected translations of symbols; to begin with 
they were met with scepticism, but later they were for the most part conﬁ rmed and had to be 
accepted … Stekel arrived at his interpretations of symbols by way of intuition, thanks to a 
peculiar gift for the direct understanding of them. But the existence of such a gift cannot be 
counted upon generally, its effectiveness is exempt from all criticism and consequently its 
ﬁ ndings have no claim to credibility (1901, p. 350).
A man with only an intuitive understanding of dream symbolism who had little 
patience with scientiﬁ c enquiry and whose work was a nuisance to science because 
it is so often correct: by and large, this is the historical image that has stuck to Stekel 
(Sachs, 1945; Jones, 1953–7; Roazen, 1975). Even Fritz Wittels, who sided with 
Stekel’s camp in his conﬂ ict with Freud (but later switched sides) and consequently 
came to know him fairly well, reﬂ ects this image, writing of Stekel that he was a 
‘dream interpreter whose equal I have never seen’ (cited in Timms, 1995, p. 112), 
yet scientiﬁ cally he seemed to have been ‘like the mental arithmeticians who call out 
3There is one exception: in the 1907 and 1910 editions of The psychopathology of everyday life, Freud 
used the expression ‘my colleague Wilhelm Stekel’ (1901, p. 120, fn.), but dropped this title after 1912.
4All quotes from sources in the German language are the authors’ translations.
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the results without using any observable method’ (p. 114). Indeed, ‘Stekel’s method 
was not to have any’ (p. 115).
In this paper we shall challenge the assertion that Stekel was not a ‘true follower’ of 
Freud because he lacked scientiﬁ c integrity and had a different (faulty) understanding 
of psychoanalysis.5 Focusing on the autobiographical element in Stekel’s publications, 
we aim to show that, to all intents and purposes, Stekel’s work was much more in line 
with that of Freud than is commonly believed; more speciﬁ cally, we shall claim that 
Stekel’s method of dream interpretation was copied from Freud’s in several respects, 
and that this imitation contributed to his distancing from Freud.
A brief overview of Stekel’s main works
Stekel’s publications date back as far as 1895 when his ﬁ rst medical paper appeared—
a study on ‘coitus in childhood’—which was cited by Freud in 1896. However, it was 
not until around 1901 that he became personally involved with psychoanalysis when 
he read The interpretation of dreams (1900) and went into brief therapy with Freud. 
Consequently, Stekel began to devote much of his time and energy to propagating 
psychoanalysis (for example, Stekel, 1907a). By 1912, the year he broke with 
Freud, he had written a considerable number of newspaper articles and booklets on 
psychoanalysis as well as four larger volumes on this subject: Nervöse Angstzustände 
(a clinical book on anxiety neurosis), Dichtung und Neurose (on the psychology of 
art and artists), Die Sprache des Traumes (on dream symbolism) and Die Träume 
der Dichter (on the psychology of poetry and crime). Apart from these works, he 
had also published several books on loosely related subjects, such as Nervöse Leute 
(1911b, a collection of popular tales on psychology) and Äskulap als Harlekin (1911a, 
a popular book with humorous sketches from the practice of a medical doctor, in 
which, however, neither Freud nor psychoanalysis are mentioned).
Sure enough, by this time Stekel was considered to be the most important 
psychoanalytic author after Freud. His book on anxiety neurosis (1921)6 drew 
much attention, as can be gathered from a letter from Jung to Freud dated 19 June 
1908 (Freud and Jung, 1974, p. 157), and it probably won many physicians over 
to psychoanalysis. His inﬂ uence on the early reception of psychoanalysis is easily 
underestimated.
After his break with Freud, Stekel continued to practise psychoanalysis, although 
his modiﬁ cation of it markedly differed from that of the Freudians: for one thing, 
he was one of the ﬁ rst to practise short-term therapy, which greatly enhanced his 
‘cultural authority’ in the United States (Park, 2004). For another, he cared much 
less for transference during therapy and, in fact, only accepted analysands if he 
could get along with them on personal terms (Stekel, 1950a, p. 117). Stekel also 
remained as productive as before. His most important post-1912 publication is the 
large ten-volume series ‘Disorders of the instincts and emotions’, published between 
5Kuhn arrives at a similar conclusion (1998), but on different grounds.
6We refer to the 3rd, much enlarged, edition of Nervöse Angstzustände; the ﬁ rst book edition appeared in 
1912. An even earlier version was published as an article (Stekel, 1907a).
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1912 and 1928, his magnum opus. All of these volumes have been translated into 
English (but not the entire series as such). Books on dream interpretation (1943) and 
technique in analytical psychotherapy (1950b) are among his last published works. 
His autobiography (1950a) appeared posthumously.
While it is difﬁ cult to give a precise estimate of the total number of publications 
by Stekel, it is easier to characterise his work in general. (In addition to almost 40 
books and booklets, Grinstein (1958) lists some 300 articles that can be attributed to 
his name; but recently Clark-Lowes (2001) claims to have identiﬁ ed well over 500 
articles.) In contrast to Freud, Stekel always remained a clinician ﬁ rst. His ‘Disorders’ 
series is, in fact, a huge project that focuses exclusively on the description of case 
material. The literally hundreds of cases described therein are virtually void of the 
sort of metapsychological speculation Freud was fond of. But Stekel had always and 
would always content himself with a simple theoretical framework and abhorred 
all the ﬁ ner distinctions Freud made, and was consequently often criticised for 
‘confusing concepts’ and ‘jumbling up everything’ during the discussions of the 
Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Nunberg and Federn, 1962–75, Vol. I, pp. 178–9, 
208, Vol. II, p. 7).
Of all these books and articles, only a few are referred to by Freud. Apart from 
the above-mentioned paper on coitus in childhood, Freud explicitly mentioned the 
following six sources: a 1904 newspaper article on ‘unconscious confessions’ (a 
discussion of which takes up two full pages in the 1909 edition of The psychopathology 
of everyday life); his 1908 book on ‘anxiety neurosis’ (in three different places); a 
1909 paper on dream symbolism, and the large 1911 book on the same subject 
(discussed in The interpretation of dreams as well as in several papers); and two 
1911 papers that were published in the Zentralblatt (in two technical papers, see 
Freud, 1912a, 1912b).
This may seem a meagre score considering Stekel’s enormous output but, 
compared to references Freud made to other followers, and considering the fact 
that there are many more references to Stekel without a speciﬁ c source indication, 
one should actually conclude that Stekel occupied no insigniﬁ cant place in Freud’s 
discourse. We return to this observation in the last part of our paper, but shall ﬁ rst 
focus on those features of Stekel’s discourse that provide the strongest links to that 
of Freud—the autobiographical narrative.
The autobiographical Stekel
Freud’s ﬁ rst step into the new sciences that was to become psychoanalysis was, as is 
well known, his famous ‘self-analysis’, and the two books in which this self-analysis 
is explored most thoroughly and carefully are The interpretation of dreams and The 
psychopathology of everyday life. The accounts in these books about Freud’s life are 
presented to the reader half as case histories and half as autobiographies. That is to 
say, in both books, the personal is very much intertwined with the epistemological part 
of the story: to understand a particular (symbolic) element in the narrative, intimate 
knowledge of the narrator’s life is required. However, that in itself is not enough; one 
must also understand the generic logic that lies beneath the symptom formation. The 
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play of interpretation therefore consists in connecting the personal and the general in 
such a way that the target of the interpretation (the narrator) cannot deny its validity. 
This is what has come to be known by Grünbaum as the ‘tally argument’ (1984): the 
fact that an interpretation must ‘tally with what is real’ in the unconscious. There is, 
however, an unintended consequence to this tying of the self to its own accounts, 
which could be called the autobiographical trap: all accounts lose their innocence 
and are forever referred back to the autobiographical self since no one can escape 
his self. Consequently, ever since Freud it has become common practice to demand 
from people that they reveal their autobiographical self in their accounts.
The interpretation of dreams and The psychopathology of everyday life had only 
just been published when Stekel ﬁ rst met Freud, but they found a fruitful interpreter 
in him.7 He was not only quick to understand that there are always hidden symbolic 
meanings behind every narrative, but he was also quick to draw the conclusion that 
nobody could escape the autobiographical trap, not even—or perhaps, in particular, 
not—the master himself. When Freud presented a dream of his own to the Vienna 
Psychoanalytic Society, Stekel was the only one who dared allow the dream to point 
back to Freud—and he was not contradicted by him either (see Nunberg and Federn, 
1962–75, Vol. II, pp. 180–7, meeting of 1 January 1911). He was perhaps the ﬁ rst in 
what has become a whole industry of discovering Freud beneath Freud. However, 
the autobiographical trap has implications for the position of the interpreter as well: 
he, too, cannot escape his own discourses. If a critique of Freud is not to bounce 
back immediately, it should be levelled from a point of view that is at least equal to 
that of Freud. And this is precisely what Stekel aimed to achieve, as we shall attempt 
to show below. However, in our reconstruction of Stekel’s position we aim to stay 
clear, as far as possible, from ‘hineininterpretieren’ and instead intend to draw 
parallels between the discourses of Freud and Stekel based on rhetorical properties 
of those discourses.
In what ways, then, can Stekel’s and Freud’s discourses be compared? 
First, much as with Freud in the famous aliquis case in The psychopathology of 
everyday life, Stekel, too, often presents his case histories in a novel-like style, 
frequently using the ﬁ rst person singular to create an immediate understanding 
with his audience. In large chunks of dialogue Stekel makes his appearances as 
a Socratic interviewer; he knows all and almost effortlessly directs the patient to 
his unconscious drives. The patients in these narratives, in turn, seem focused 
very much on him as well, often misspelling or forgetting his name and thereby 
betraying his real intents, or otherwise dreaming about him. However, unlike 
Freud’s examples, Stekel’s cases never leave room for doubt. They are always 
complete successes. Freud somewhat cynically wrote of Stekel’s book on dream 
symbolism, ‘The aura of optimism that hovers over the whole performance—we 
are always right, all our ﬁ ndings ﬁ t together, are useful, and so on—may repel us, 
but the practitioner won’t mind it at all; they welcome illusions’ (Freud to Jung, 
13 August 1908, Freud and Jung, 1974, p. 168).
7Stekel had a copy of both books with a dedication by Freud acknowledging their friendship and, above 
all, his early appreciation of psychoanalysis—Stekel wrote a positive book review of The interpretation 
of dreams in 1902—(see Stekel, 1926, p. 553).
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It is true that many of Stekel’s cases seem to ﬁ t too perfectly, as if they were 
made up. They are sometimes so crude, even to the point of being fantastic, that 
they appear to be almost a parody of psychoanalysis. It is well known that some 
analysts (in particular Tausk) thought that Stekel made up his own case histories. 
Stekel, who was well aware of this accusation, somewhat clumsily replied, ‘If I had 
invented my cases I should undoubtedly be a greater poet than Shakespeare’ (1950a, 
p. 142). His proverbial ‘Wednesday evening patient’ has nevertheless continued to 
be a testimony to his unscrupulous unscientiﬁ c methods. It may well be, however, 
that the impression of forgery is actually prompted by Stekel’s attempt to imitate 
Freud’s narrative style. The following case history, one of many, may serve as an 
example (Stekel, 1921, pp. 323–4): a patient dreams about being with a doctor, even 
as she is about to leave. While dressing herself, some slimy substance drips from 
her hand on to a piece of paper. ‘Of course I am the doctor’, explains Stekel, and 
‘dressing herself is the reverse of undressing herself’, and yes, ‘the slimy substance 
is sperm. It’s about coitus’ (pp. 323–4).
Such self-glorifying narratives obviously made Stekel even more vulnerable 
to critique than already was the case. Moreover, it becomes even worse when the 
rivalry between Stekel and Freud surfaces in the dreams of his patients, as happens 
in Die Sprache des Traumes, where a patient dreams of going up on a ladder and 
shortly afterwards dreams of a professor. The patient, who is a psychoanalyst 
himself, ‘resists the uncovering of his inner secrets’; he wants to ‘complain about 
Stekel to Freud’, says Stekel. ‘He wants to stand above me, he wants to triumph over 
me with the help of Prof. Freud’ (1922a, p. 393).
His rivalry with Freud had already surfaced during the meetings of the Vienna 
Society, but the autobiographical trap made it almost impossible for Stekel to 
criticise the master openly. Consequently, some of the more critical narratives found 
their way into the ‘popular works’, where they are covered up with humour or a 
pseudonym (or both). His 1911 Äskulap als Harlekin, for example, contains a barely 
concealed complaint about Freud appropriating his ideas. This book, which was 
published under a pseudonym, appeared at a time when he had made public two 
of his most important ﬁ ndings: ‘the law of bipolarity’ (the hypothesis that every 
act is determined by two opposing forces) and the discovery that all dreams are 
‘polymorph criminal’ [universell kriminell], a rival to Freud’s hypothesis of the 
‘polymorph perverse unconsciousness’. Both ideas were unanimously denounced 
at the meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Freud is quoted as saying, 
for example, that the concept of the ‘criminal instinct’ does not explain anything, 
that it is the viewpoint of an outsider (Nunberg and Federn, 1962–75, Vol. III, min. 
155), and others were quick to reduce the ‘law of bipolarity’ to a mere rephrasing 
of what the Professor had already said. Interestingly, from Lou Andreas-Salomé’s 
diary notes (1987, p. 94), we learn that it seems as if Freud did not think so low 
of the concept of ‘polymorphous criminality’, which, although considered by him 
to be a ‘methodological leap’, apparently hit a deeper meaning: the anxiety about 
oneself. Stekel himself complained of how they made fun of him in the society, 
nicknaming him ‘Stekel with his Bipolarity’ (1950a, p. 132). The disappointment 
he felt about this hostile reception is reﬂ ected in the ﬁ rst story in his Äskulap book, 
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which is about a humorist who desperately wants to have an idea of his own. When 
he ﬁ nally ﬁ nds one, he bumps into ‘his old professor’, bureaucrat X: ‘The Professor 
assures me I am a real original thinker (what irony!). He reads my stories with 
great pleasure. I ought to write something nice again real soon’. When he leaves the 
‘Professor’, the idea is mysteriously gone: ‘Is it that between one’s own thoughts 
and bureaucracy professors stand, or is there between these ideas and professors 
who are bureaucratic, an enmity?’ (1911a, p. 4). The story ends with the humorist 
being committed to an asylum, where his case is presented to an assistant with the 
following speech: ‘an interesting case of monomania … This man suffers from the 
newest illusion of grandeur. He believes he owns an idea of his own’ (p. 6).
A third sense in which Stekel is present in his own work is where he relates his 
own dreams, slips, mistakes etc. Again, Freud, who with the famous Irma dream in 
The interpretation of dreams, opened the door to a whole array of autobiographical 
pseudo-confessions, sets the example. In the above-mentioned 1904 newspaper 
article, for instance, Stekel narrates several examples of unconsciously determined 
actions: he accidentally expresses the exact opposite of what he should have said 
(‘I hope you will not leave your bed soon’, to a patient) or clumsily unfastens the 
dress of a lady friend etc.; examples that support Freud’s thesis as developed in 
The psychopathology of everyday life and that were, for that reason, quoted by him 
(Freud, 1901, pp. 68–9). More autobiographical material appears in the Die Sprache 
des Traumes (Stekel, 1922a, pp. 341–2), where he links the numbers 14 and 41 
in a dream with a fear of masturbation (he was 14 years of age when he read a 
popular book by Dr Retau warning its readers against this practice, which upset him 
terribly). The theme of the fear of masturbation returns time and again in his works, 
as, for example, in his series of educational letters to a mother (1927–9), where he 
again relates of his reading Dr Retau’s book and the terrible consequences it had. 
Masturbation was also the last topic to be discussed in the Vienna Psychoanalytic 
Society before Stekel was expelled from this society (Nunberg and Federn, 1962–
75). Against Freud’s opinion that adult masturbation is harmful in a psychological 
as well as a physical sense, Stekel (1950c) strongly advocated this practice, arguing 
that those who repress the urge to masturbate become neurotic (see Groenendijk, 
1997, for a discussion of the differences between Freud and Stekel on the topic of 
masturbation).
The implicit suggestion in the masturbation debate is that Stekel himself is the 
living proof of his thesis. Or, in other words, that there is a fourth set of self-narratives, 
which are the autobiographical narratives in disguise. Thanks to the publication of his 
Autobiography (1950a), it is now easy to see that a number of case histories published 
by Stekel are really covert autobiographical accounts. Particularly, his book on dream 
interpretations (1943) contains many accounts of covert autobiographical narratives, 
but even his very ﬁ rst article on ‘coitus in childhood’ (1895) can be reconstructed 
as a narrative about his own childhood, as the editor of his Autobiography already 
noted in a footnote (Stekel, 1950a, p. 33). In many of these narratives, masturbation 
again plays an important role. In the next section of this paper we shall explore one 
such case in detail; sufﬁ ce it for now to observe that here, too, Stekel had followed 
the example Freud set in The interpretation of dreams and The psychopathology of 
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everyday life, which are, as is well known, full of self-narratives as well as covert 
autobiographical accounts. Perhaps Freud’s readers, including Stekel, were more 
aware of that fact than we realise.
The discussion of the autobiographical position therefore makes it clear that, in 
order to become an analyst, Stekel strongly identiﬁ ed with Freud and followed him 
in detail (see Bos, 2003, for additional evidence to support this claim). However, 
his identiﬁ cation with Freud’s style is only the ﬁ rst step in the transformation of his 
identity. As we shall explore, the next step consists in the appropriation of Freud’s 
self-analysis.
Confessions and conjectures: The case of a lost ﬂ ute
When Stekel wrote his Autobiography in London during the last months of his life, he 
aimed to sketch a picture of his inner drives in an open and unreserved way, so that 
future generations of students could use it ‘as a source for analytic research’ (1950a, 
p. 12, editor’s preface). He believed to be more or less following the example set by 
Rousseau, who had spoken freely and unreservedly about his own sexuality (p. 29). 
Indeed, Rousseau seemed ‘obsessed with publicising unsavoury incidents, chieﬂ y 
sordid sexual scenes’, says Peter Gay (1995, p. 107).
Interestingly, Stekel had analysed Rousseau’s Confessions extensively in his 
book on psychosexual infantilism (1922b). His main argument therein was that, 
thanks to Rousseau’s ‘infantile exhibitionism’, he could uncover the deeper layers 
of the artistic drive in general, which are made up of a speciﬁ c combination 
of homosexuality and paranoia. Unlike the average neurotic, the artist himself 
transcends these ‘darker drives’ and becomes a creative human being.
If Stekel had meant to follow Rousseau’s example, it is remarkable, to say the 
least, that none of the elements he found in his predecessor surface in his own work. 
Stekel’s ‘confessions’ are neither candid nor unreserved. There is no reference 
to any overt or covert homosexual drive (in fact, there is a heavy emphasis on 
heterosexuality) but, more importantly, the autobiography certainly does not leave 
the impression of a man who was able to transcend the average. Instead, we engage 
with someone who apparently suffered from delusions of grandeur, and who had not 
mastered his ‘complexes’, that is, his lifelong struggle with Freud.8
In fact, the Autobiography does not in the least resemble a confession. It is 
probably more accurate to say that it was modelled on Goethe’s 1795 novel Wilhelm 
Meister’s apprenticeship (1995), about a man’s search for a vocation. This book was 
written as an unusual mixture of autobiography and art—Wahrheit und Dichtung, to 
use the old master’s own words. It is for this reason that historians of psychoanalysis 
generally dismissed Stekel’s Autobiography as a one-sided, untrustworthy account. 
Yet, with all its faults and inaccuracies, it does provide clues to Stekel’s private life 
and, more importantly, it allows us to reread his work in a new light, one that in the 
8The Autobiography was still incomplete at the time Stekel died and it is difﬁ cult to assess how much 
the editor altered or changed the manuscript to complete it. Stekel’s son, Eric-Paul Stekel, however, 
expressed considerable doubt about its reliability (see Timms, 1996, p. 48fn.).
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end also contributes to a better understanding of Freud’s inﬂ uence, we believe. We 
restrict our reading of this work to one story.
The Autobiography opens with an account of his youth in Boyan, Bukovina. 
Stekel outlines his ﬁ rst recollections, which seem ‘indifferent, without emotion and 
without importance’ (1950a, p. 31). Such a disclaimer, as any reader of Stekel should 
know, must of course be taken for the exact opposite—and we shall see why. Stekel 
remembers the house he lived in, located at a crossroads, and he sees a simple cart in 
which his grandmother is sitting. A second memory: his grandmother has died and 
Stekel’s mother goes to her funeral. Between these two events, the author situates 
an event that ‘determined my whole life’. He is about 2½ years old and he visits his 
grandmother in Boyan. While walking on the street, he meets a girl who asks him to 
play with her. Off they go and play
the favourite game of children, ‘father and mother’ … Nearby is an improvised shed, which 
I distinctly remember … We entered the shed and looked cautiously around us. Then we 
continued to play ‘father and mother’, and this time we enjoyed the physical side of our 
‘marriage’ (p. 32).
Thirty years later Stekel meets the girl again, now as his patient. She has 
completely forgotten about their playing together, all she remembers is how his 
brother once knocked her down: a ‘screen memory’, Stekel concludes. Did he see 
her a second time? he asks himself. He does not know; all he remembers is seeing 
himself, sitting in a cart, riding home.
I have made a small wooden ﬂ ute like those which peasants make. I try to play on it. The 
ﬂ ute falls from my hand to the road. I cry bitterly. The carriage stops. Some of the men go 
down to look for the ﬂ ute. The passengers are in a hurry. They shout to the driver ‘Go on! 
Go on!’. The cart rumbles and creaks over the dusty road. I sadly look back. My crying 
has been in vain. The hot sun presses the tears against my cheeks. The wonderful ﬂ ute is 
lost for ever (p. 33).
We have quoted considerably from this peculiar mixture of dreamlike recollection 
and autobiography because it corresponds largely with a case history narrated in the 
ﬁ rst volume of Impotence in the male (Stekel, 1971). The case history, presented to 
us as an important ‘document humain’, is about a 40-year-old medical doctor who 
goes by the initials of ‘NM’. In this case history, the subject remembers how he, at 
the age of 3, played ‘being married’ with a girl. They creep into a hayloft and he 
looks at her genitals, has a strong erection and actually attempts coitus.
I do not recall whether I repeated this game with the girl. I believe I only visited my 
grandmother, who lived in the country, for a day, and had to return to the city the next day. 
This recollection is mixed up with a second one, which I consider a ‘screen memory’. I 
received a cheap shepard’s ﬂ ute from my grandmother, and let it fall from the wagon while 
we were rapidly driving to the city. The wagon stopped; an unsuccessful search was made for 
it; and I cried bitterly. The lost ﬂ ute! Is it not a symbol for the abandonment of the pretty girl, 
the ﬁ rst of my long series of erotic adventures? (p. 117).
A few details do not match exactly: Stekel is 2½ years old, ‘NM’ 3 years of age; the shed 
is a hayloft; the girl’s ‘screen memory’ is now his own, but, even so, these two accounts 
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are clearly identical and the identity is positively established by the ‘insigniﬁ cant 
recollection’ of the grandmother sitting in the cart that encases the ‘life-determining’ 
event. ‘NM’ can be none other than Stekel himself.9 This fact is not insigniﬁ cant 
precisely because the case history of NM does not end here, but, in fact, gives detailed 
information about its subject, in particular about his sex life. We thus come to know 
the hero of the story as a sexually active person who, at a very early age, had already 
had very intimate relations and later even becomes something of a sexual athlete. What 
remains vague in the autobiography is clearly expressed in the case history: the ‘father 
and mother’ game means intercourse. It continues: by the time the subject goes to 
Gymnasium he practises masturbation on a daily basis; aged 14 he visits a brothel 
for the ﬁ rst time; and at the age of 17 he has an affair with a chambermaid, which 
unfortunately results in hysterical impotence. After two years of suffering he meets the 
woman who will later become his wife; this relationship cured him of his impotence 
and he was now ‘able to carry out coitus seven times and subsequently ten times in a 
brief interval of time’, an observation that could be ‘conﬁ rmed by his wife’ (p. 126).
The basic psychological model behind this narrative is the following: a healthy 
sexual condition is spoiled by feelings of doubt and fear induced by an unnatural, 
repressive voice (warning the child that masturbation ruins one’s health), which 
only later results in impotence. Health is only restored when ‘insight’ is gained, 
allowing the adult to become sexually free again.
Indeed, in the covert autobiographical case history we encounter a strong, self-
conﬁ dent Stekel, athletically built, a free-thinker and a conﬁ rmed atheist, free of 
complexes. ‘I aspire to the high plane of a Nietzsche who believes every person has his 
own morals’, he has NM proclaiming. ‘But my inner (unconscious) morals are stronger 
than my intellect. In the course of the years, I have learned to listen to this inner voice, 
and, since I have done it, know that I will never be impotent again’ (p. 126).
Again and again, Stekel would replicate this successful model in the narratives 
of his patients, whose neurotic problems were often traced back to the repression 
of masturbation or some other psychological conﬂ ict during childhood, and were 
completely cured after only a brief but ‘active’ therapy with Stekel.10
The story of the lost ﬂ ute is presented to the reader without virtually any 
interpretation, a peculiarity in itself for a writer who was quick to recognise a 
9There is, of course, another possibility, namely that Stekel appropriated NM’s story and made it his own, 
rather than the other way around. We believe this to be unlikely, however, in the light of other biographical 
information given about NM, not discussed here. Another indication that the letters ‘NM’ stand for Stekel 
is that, in Latin, these two letters mean Nomen Meum (‘my name’). In either case (whether it is truly his 
story or only a story he ‘borrowed’ to make his own), our reading of it as an account of an auto-analysis 
remains the same.
10When, in 1925, the Ufa ﬁ lm company proposed making a ﬁ lm about psychoanalysis, Freud ﬂ atly 
refused to co-operate. The ﬁ lm was then made with the aid of Hanns Sachs and Karl Abraham and 
released as Geheimnisse einer Seele (Secrets of a Soul) in 1926 under the directorship of GW Pabst. 
The movie is about a man who becomes impotent when a childhood conﬂ ict re-emerges later in his life. 
He is completely cured during what appears to be active psychotherapy. Although Freud did not see the 
ﬁ lm script beforehand, nor was it likely that he ever saw the completed movie, it was the Stekelian-type 
of vulgarisation of psychoanalysis that put him off, as he wrote to Abraham that he did not think it was 
possible to represent psychoanalytic abstraction in any respectable way on ﬁ lm (Freud to Abraham, 9 
June 1923, Freud and Abraham, 1965).
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symbolic meaning behind almost everything. Thus in the Autobiography the story 
ends on the sad note that ‘the wonderful ﬂ ute was lost for ever’ (1950a, p. 33). But 
in the case history of NM, the account breaks off at the point where the narrator 
‘knows that [he] will never be impotent again’, whereupon Stekel concludes with 
the rhetorical question: ‘Is [the ﬂ ute] not a symbol for the abandonment of the pretty 
girl, the ﬁ rst of my long series of erotic adventures?’ (1971, p. 117). Considering the 
fact, however, that the ‘patient’ was impotent for over two years and that he regains 
his potency only when he returns to a situation that closely resembles the childlike 
situation of his youth, it is difﬁ cult to see how the ‘lost ﬂ ute’ can be anything but 
a symbol for precisely this lost potency. However, Stekel purposely chose not to 
interpret his covert autobiographical account in psychoanalytical terms; he wanted it 
to remain ‘blind’. In fact, ‘in simple cases’, Stekel wrote, ‘recovery may be induced 
by nothing more than suggestion without going into the deeper motives’ (p. 127).
Stekel’s blind spots: The analysis that failed
If the case history of NM is really a covert autobiographical narrative, as we have 
argued, then why is it so uninsightful; why does it not clarify its subject’s psychology? 
The answer to this question can be found if we contrast Stekel’s methodological 
viewpoint with those of Freud.
From the autobiographical case of NM, we learn that Stekel was convinced that 
it is an analyst’s duty to actively interfere in the patient’s life: ‘The psychotherapist 
must … convince the patient that fear makes him impotent’ (1971, p. 127). In order to 
do so, he should have an immediate understanding of the patient’s needs and troubles. 
He believed that he himself was luckily endowed with the gift of interpretation, as not 
even Freud would deny. ‘I think it will be generally acknowledged that I have some 
skill as interpreter of dreams’, he once said (1943, p. 71). To him, psychoanalysis 
resembles an art; an art for which one needs to be equipped with a certain sensitivity 
to learn it, which not everybody has: ‘It’s an artist’s assignment and it can never 
become a trade’ (1922a, p. 442).
Having said that, he acknowledged at the same time that
every analyst has his own complexes which psychoanalysis does not clarify to him if he is 
not conscious of them. I call this the ‘psychoanalytic scotoma’ [blind spots]. It is therefore 
necessary to learn from one’s own dream analyses and to accept oneself in the ﬁ rst place 
(p. 442).
These scotoma make analysts ‘BLIND TO SUCH COMPLEXES HE HIMSELF HAS’, he wrote 
in capital letters in his book on dream interpretation (1943, p. 511), because ‘every 
psychotherapist who is under the dominion of an overcharged idea will tend to 
introduce this idea into any dream he analyses’ (p. 512).
The key problem of blind spots calls forth the question of training, which, as is 
well known, began to surface in psychoanalysis for the ﬁ rst time at about the time 
that Stekel was expelled from the movement in 1912, and which was a question that 
was not to be resolved until after the Second World War (see Wallerstein, 1998, for a 
history of the debates on this issue). It is generally believed that it is precisely at this 
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point when psychoanalysis began to professionalise that unorthodox analysts such as 
Stekel, whose ‘wild’ and ‘intuitive’ methods made him unﬁ t for the profession, were 
ﬁ nally done away with. It will come as a surprise, then, that Stekel’s position in the 
question of training analysis was actually quite sophisticated and, in many respects, 
in accordance with Freud’s beliefs on the matter—albeit not in all respects.
Building on the assumption of ‘blind spots’, Stekel argued ﬁ rst of all, in a section 
on ‘auto-analysis’ in his book on dream interpretation, that it is not sufﬁ cient for an 
analyst to analyse his own dreams:
When my pupils ask me whether auto-analysis is possible, I usually say: ‘It is as impossible 
for a man to analyse himself as it is for a man to play chess against himself. One cannot at 
the same time be accusing counsel, judge, defending counsel, and reporter. Every attempt 
at auto-analysis leads swiftly to a frontier which the would-be auto-analyst cannot cross’ 
(1943, p. 184).
Consequently, he argued, it is imperative that
every analyst should himself have been analysed, if only as a preliminary to his practising 
dream interpretation. Of course this would only be a perfect safeguard if an analysis could 
be relied upon to free the analysand from complexes. But that, alas, is too much to expect. 
A psychotherapist who is unduly self-centred will not give the requisite attention to the 
dream his patient relates. Successful intuitive interpretation presupposes that the interpreter 
can achieve full imaginative insight into the working of the patient’s mind. One who is 
himself preoccupied with cares, doubts, shattering experiences, or is subject to a parapathy 
[neurosis], may fail to interpret a dream because he is incapable of imaginative insight 
(empathy) (p. 512).
For this reason, Stekel also warned against turning former patients into analysts, 
and ﬁ ercely opposed lay analysis. In his book Technique of analytical psychotherapy, 
Stekel wrote that it is a ‘mistake’ when an analyst educates his ex-patients to become 
psychoanalysts: ‘It is obvious that this is the path taken by many of those doctors 
who become psychoanalysts’ (1950b, p. 390).
In short, psychoanalysis was to Stekel not a trade you could learn by reading 
Freud’s books, but an art that one could only learn through a proper analysis of 
oneself, analogous to the master–pupil apprenticeship of old, restricted to those few 
who have an innate sensitivity for it and who are medically trained. In other words, 
in all but the last point did he concur with Freud.
How did Stekel himself ﬁ t into this model? We remember that he had, indeed, 
been (brieﬂ y) in analysis with Freud around the turn of the century and became an 
analyst himself shortly afterwards. He wrote that it was from Freud that he learned 
‘the art of dream interpretation’ (1943, p. 180). Nevertheless, recall that it was 
sexual problems (Wirrnisse, or ‘confusions’, as he wrote in a 1926 account) that ﬁ rst 
brought him to Freud. Freud diagnosed these ‘confusions’ to be related to a ‘mother 
ﬁ xation’. Stekel wrote, ‘I was astonished. My relations to my mother are like those 
of a normal human being, I was able to separate from her early’ (1926, p. 540).
So it was Stekel who broke off his therapy with Freud, allegedly after a mere 
eight sessions. However, the reasons why he did so are not entirely clear. He wrote 
of this unsuccessful analysis in the Autobiography, claiming that he disagreed with 
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Freud on the diagnosis of ‘mother ﬁ xation’. At this point, however, the narrative of 
his analysis abruptly breaks off, only to be continued with an account of how he fell 
ill, went to Abbazia in Italy, and how he recovered there without any help, simply 
by ignoring his doctor’s advice. ‘What did you do to produce this miracle?’ the 
doctor asked. ‘I confessed that I had not followed his instructions, that I had taken 
long walks. He repeated his warning, but I knew that my treatment was concluded’ 
(1950a, p. 110).
There is a threefold suggestion in these parallel stories, which is important 
for our understanding of both Stekel and Freud. In the way we understand it, the 
implication would be that Stekel was ﬁ rst of all properly trained by Freud, while 
he was at the same time cured of his ‘sexual problems’, which had never been 
psychological ‘complexes’ in the ﬁ rst place but mere ‘confusions’, and lastly, and 
most importantly, that he had equalled the master because he understood better than 
Freud his inner psychological condition. Indeed, Freud had never been analysed 
himself and, as a result of that, ‘Freud in The interpretation of dreams, overlooks 
important complexes where his own dreams are concerned’ (Stekel, 1943, p. 180).
With this conclusion in mind, we return to the lost-ﬂ ute narrative, which we can 
now read as an imitation of Freud’s self-analysis in The interpretation of dreams. 
Much as Freud presented fragments from this auto-analysis but nevertheless did 
not reveal the Freud behind Freud (the unconscious Freud) and always remains 
a vague, ‘opaque person’ [undurchsichtige Persönlichkeit] in his own work, as 
Jaspers (1948, p. 646) aptly wrote, suggesting that none of his dreams reveals 
anything remotely neurotic, so does the covert autobiography of Stekel present 
its subject as an essentially sane person, free of serious complexes, without ‘blind 
spots’.
The idea of ‘scotoma’ or blind spots in relation to training analysis builds the 
last and perhaps most interesting link with Freud. In 1912, after Stekel’s book on the 
Language of dreams was published, in which the idea of ‘blind spots’ ﬁ rst surfaced, 
Freud wrote a short paper entitled ‘Recommendations on analytic technique’ (1912a). 
It was ﬁ rst published in the Zentralblatt, edited by Stekel, and it contains several 
rather disconnected sections on technical rules in analysis. One of them (section ‘f’) 
is on the question of auto- and training analysis. Freud writes,
Just as the patient must relate everything that his self-observation can detect, and keep back 
all the logical and affective objections that seek to induce him to make a selection from among 
them, so the doctor must put himself in a position to make use of everything he is told for 
the purpose of interpretation and of recognising the concealed unconscious material without 
substituting a censorship of his own for the selection that the patient has forgone. To put it in 
a formula: he must turn his own unconscious like a receptive organ towards the transmitting 
unconscious of the patient … But if the doctor is to be in a position to use his unconscious in 
this way as an instrument in the analysis, he must himself fulﬁ l one psychological condition 
to a high degree. He may not tolerate any resistances in himself which hold back from his 
consciousness what has been perceived by his unconscious; otherwise he would introduce 
into analysis a new species of selection and distortion which would be far more detrimental 
than that resulting from concentration of conscious attention. It is not enough for him that 
he should be an approximately normal person. It may be insisted, rather, that he should have 
undergone a psycho-analytic puriﬁ cation and have become aware of those complexes of his 
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own which would be apt to interfere with his grasp of what the patient tells him. There can 
be no reasonable doubt about the disqualifying effect of such defects in the doctor; every 
unresolved repression in him constitutes what has been aptly described by Stekel as a blind 
spot in his analytic perception (pp. 115–6).
Freud’s argument in favour of training analysis and contra auto-analysis seems in 
perfect accordance with Stekel’s position as outlined above. However, it is not too 
difﬁ cult to see how this particular section can be read as a covert critique of Stekel. 
In the ﬁ rst part, Freud emphasises how the analyst must use his unconsciousness 
‘like a receptive organ’ in order to listen to the patients’ unconsciousness, and we 
recall that it was Stekel who was famous for having such an intuitive understanding 
of psychoanalysis. When Freud argues that it is not enough that the doctor 
‘approximates a normal person’, he may have had in mind the sort of critique he 
vented to Jung when he wrote that Stekel ‘contents himself with approximations’ 
(Freud to Jung, 13 August 1908, Freud and Jung, 1974, p. 168). The critical element 
in these passages is, however, located in Freud’s ironic use of the term ‘blind spots’, 
when he writes that the control of conscious thinking is achieved in training analysis, 
so as to learn to recognise one’s unresolved repressions or ‘blind spots’. This is 
exactly what Stekel had failed to learn, in Freud’s opinion. It echoes a critique 
that he had brought forward from 1908 onwards, when Freud said at a meeting 
of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society that Stekel ‘has a ﬂ air for psychogenetic 
complexes … the trouble is that he relies exclusively on his inspirations, instead 
of submitting them to the control of conscious thinking’ (quoted in Nunberg and 
Federn, 1962–75, Vol. II, p. 10).
Contrary to Stekel, Freud never thought of Stekel’s analysis as a success, nor did 
he consider it a training analysis. When Jung reproached Freud for having treated 
his pupils, in particular Stekel, like patients (Jung to Freud, 18 December 1912, 
Freud and Jung, 1974, pp. 534–5), Freud answered, ‘[It] is quite true that since 
Stekel, for example, discontinued his treatment with me some ten years ago, I have 
never said one word to him about the analysis of his own person’ (Freud to Jung, 22 
December 1912, Freud and Jung, 1974, p. 537), suggesting that his person was not 
free of blind spots.
Clearly, Freud not only disapproved of Stekel’s incorrigible ‘shallow psychology’, 
he also abhorred the ‘blind spots’ in his analyses as well: the fact that all of Stekel’s 
successful cures resemble his own unsuccessful analysis. In Stekel’s work, the 
invariable reduction of problems to a psychological condition of doubt, related to the 
masturbation/impotence hypothesis, seemed like an endless repetition of his aborted 
analysis with Freud. But Freud failed to see what Jung clearly could see: that he 
himself was, in a sense, to blame for that, not only because he treated his pupils like 
patients, thus producing ‘either slavish sons or impudent puppies’ (Jung to Freud, 
18 December 1912 Freud and Jung, 1974, p. 534), but also, we argue, because of the 
emphasis on the element of auto-analysis in his early publications. In his attempt to 
appropriate Freud’s methods, Stekel had imitated Freud’s autobiographical style to 
the detail, copying his use of (covert) self-analysis in his publications. His tragedy 
was that this did not bring him closer to the master but, in fact, only distanced him 
further from him.
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Translations of summary
Die Kunst der Nachahmung: Wilhelm Stekels Lehrjahre. In den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse wurde die 
Arbeit von Wilhelm Stekel (1868-1940) im Großen und Ganzen kaum zur Kenntnis genommen, obwohl er 
eine beträchtliche Anzahl psychoanalytischer Untersuchungen verfasst hat, die auf Freuds frühes Denken 
einen wichtigen Einﬂ uss ausübten. Freud wiederum hat Stekel weit stärker beeinﬂ usst, als gemeinhin 
angenommen wird. In diesem Beitrag versuchen die Autoren, einige dieser wechselseitigen Einﬂ üsse, die 
insbesondere auf dem Gebiet der Praxis erkennbar werden, aufzudecken, indem sie sich auf das Element 
der Autobiograﬁ e und der Selbstanalyse konzentrieren. Die Autoren haben in Stekels Werk eine Reihe 
versteckter autobiograﬁ scher Passagen entdeckt und versuchen, eine dieser „Enthüllungen“ mit einer 
ebenso versteckten Reaktion Freuds auf diese Passage zu verbinden. Im abschließenden Teil des Beitrags 
vertreten die Autoren die Ansicht, dass Stekels Versuch, Freuds Selbstanalyse zu imitieren, zum Bruch 
zwischen ihnen beitrug.
El arte de la imitación. Los lehrjahre de Wilhelm Stekel. En la temprana historia del psicoanálisis la 
obra de Wilhelm Stekel (1868-1940), autor de un número considerable de trabajos psicoanalíticos,  fue 
poco considerada. Algunos de sus trabajos tuvieron gran inﬂ uencia en el pensamiento temprano de Freud, 
quien a su vez, tuvo mucho más inﬂ uencia sobre Stekel de lo que suele creerse. En este artículo, cuyo 
título alude a la novela semiautobiográﬁ ca de formación Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, de J.W. Goethe, los 
autores buscan sacar a la luz algunas de estas inﬂ uencias mutuas, en particular en el campo de la práctica 
clínica,   focalizando la atención  en aspectos autobiograﬁ cos y de autoanálisis. Los autores han identiﬁ cado 
un número de pasajes autobiográﬁ cos encubiertos en la obra de Stekel, e intentan vincular una de estas 
‘revelaciones’ con una respuesta de Freud igualmente encubierta.  En la última sección del artículo, los 
autores argumentan que el intento de Stekel de imitar el autoanálisis de Freud contribuyó a la ruptura entre 
ellos.
L’art de l’imitation. Le Lehrjahre de Wilhelm Stekel. Dans les premiers temps de l’histoire de la 
psychanalyse, les travaux de Wilhelm Stekel (1868-1940) ont été dans l’ensemble méconnus, alors 
même qu’il a écrit un nombre considérable d’études psychanalytiques, qui pour certaines devraient être 
considérées comme ayant eu une inﬂ uence majeure sur la pensée de Freud à ses débuts. Freud, en retour, 
avait une bien plus grande inﬂ uence sur Stekel qu’il n’est couramment admis. Dans cet article, les auteurs se 
proposent de mettre en lumière quelques unes de ces inﬂ uences mutuelles, en particulier dans le champ de 
la pratique, en se concentrant sur l’autobiographie et l’auto-analyse. Les auteurs ont identiﬁ é de nombreux 
passages autobiographiques masqués dans l’œuvre de Stekel, et tentent d’établir un lien entre l’une de ces 
« révélations » et une réponse  tout aussi masquée de Freud. Dans la dernière partie de l’article, les auteurs 
développent l’argument que la tentative de Stekel d’imiter l’auto-analyse de Freud a contribué à la rupture 
entre les deux hommes.
L’arte dell’imitazione: Lehrjahre di Wilhelm Stekel. Agli inizi della storia della psicoanalisi l’opera di 
Wilhelm Stekel (1868–1940) restò per lo più negletta, anche se egli scrisse un numero notevole di studi 
psicoanalitici, alcuni dei quali dovrebbero essere presi in considerazione per il fatto di aver esercitato un 
importante inﬂ usso sulla prima fase del pensiero di Freud. Freud, a sua volta, esercitò su Steckel un’inﬂ uenza 
assai maggiore di quanto comunemente non si creda. In quest’articolo gli autori si propongono di scoprire 
alcuni di questi inﬂ ussi reciproci, in particolare nel campo della pratica clinica, focalizzando l’attenzione su 
elementi autobiograﬁ ci e di autoanalisi. Essi hanno identiﬁ cato nell’opera di Stekel un certo numero di passi 
velatamente autobiograﬁ ci e cercano di collegare una di queste “rivelazioni” a un’altrettanto velata risposta 
di Freud. In chiusura d’articolo gli autori sostengono che il tentativo di Stekel d’imitare l’autoanalisi di 
Freud contribuì alla rottura tra i due.
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